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6. The evolution of global legal
pluralism
Paul Schiff Berman*
Global legal pluralism is now recognized as an entrenched reality of the
international and transnational legal order. Indeed, wherever one looks,
there is conflict among multiple legal regimes. Some of these regimes are
state-based, some are built and maintained by non-state actors, some fall
within the purview of local authorities and jurisdictional entities, and
some involve international courts, tribunals, arbitral bodies, and regula-
tory organizations.1
It has now been approximately 20 years since scholars first began
pushing the insights of legal pluralism into the transnational and inter-
national arena. During those two decades, a rich body of work has
established pluralism as a useful descriptive and normative framework for
understanding a world of overlapping jurisdictional assertions, both state
and non-state. Indeed, there has been a veritable explosion of scholarly
work on legal pluralism, soft law, global constitutionalism, the relation-
ships among relative authorities, and the fragmentation and reinforcement
of territorial boundaries.
Thus, the time has come for a survey and analysis of this literature in
order to understand the evolution of global legal pluralism as a scholarly
trope. In this chapter, I seek to begin such a task by separating out some
of the descriptive and normative strands in the scholarly discourse. In
addition, I tackle challenges and criticisms of global legal pluralism and
aim to refine the field based on recent research. The result, I hope, will
be to re-energize and engage global legal pluralism scholarship and push
its trajectory forward into another two decades of innovation.
* I am grateful to Keturah Taylor for useful research assistance in the final
stages of preparing this chapter.
1 PS Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond
Borders (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012). The present chapter
includes material derived from this book.
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It is particularly important that this engagement with global legal
pluralism occur as part of a collection devoted to the idea of authority. At
the core of all work on global legal pluralism is the question of authority.
Pluralists recognize that authority is never either singular or total. Rather,
any claim to authority immediately faces contestation, competition, and
resistance from other claims to authority. Accordingly, those who seek to
assert authority must always contend with a world of multiple jurisdic-
tional claims. Pluralism provides a useful framework for conceptualizing
the contestation and the inevitable negotiations that result.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL LEGAL
PLURALISM
Legal pluralists have long recognized that societies consist of multiple
overlapping normative communities. These communities are sometimes
state-based but sometimes not, and they are sometimes formal, official,
and governmental, but again sometimes they are not. Scholars studying
interactions among these multiple communities have often used the term
‘legal pluralism’ to describe the inevitable intermingling of these norma-
tive systems.2
The study of plural normative systems has arisen from a variety of
different scholarly traditions. Perhaps the earliest studies of the clashes
between state and non-state authority were those penned by lawyers,
philosophers, and theologians interested in the respective realms of
2 The history of ‘legal pluralism’ is a matter of some debate. Some associate
the term with legal anthropology, see, e.g., BZ Tamanaha, ‘The Folly of Legal
Pluralism’ (1993) 20 Journal of Law and Society 192; SE Merry, ‘Legal
Pluralism’ (1988) 22 Journal of Law and Society 869, while others, see, e.g., F
Benda-Beckmann, ‘Citizens, Strangers, and Indigenous Peoples: Conceptual
Politics and Legal Pluralism’ (1997) 9 Law and Anthropology 1, trace the use of
the term to lawyers: see MB Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to
Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975). Still others
see legal pluralism deriving from church/state conflicts-of-law analysis, see, e.g.,
M Galanter, ‘Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous
Law’ (1981) 19 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1. For discussions of the history of
‘legal pluralism’, see J Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ (1986) 24 Journal of
Legal Pluralism 1; Merry, above; J Vanderlinden, ‘Return to Legal Pluralism’
(1989) 28 Journal of Legal Pluralism 149; B de S Santos, ‘Law: A Map of
Misreading: Towards a Post-Modern Conception of Law’ (1987) 14 Journal of
Law and Society 279; Benda-Beckmann, above; Tamanaha, above.
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church and state authority.3 Likewise, historians analysing the regulatory
role of non-state entities such as jockey clubs and stock exchanges noted
that these entities often wield more power than formal state law.4 Others
have emphasized jurisdictional contestation as a core feature of the
creation and maintenance of empires.5 Anthropologists used the idea of
legal pluralism to conceptualize the relationship between colonial and
indigenous legal systems.6 Social norms theorists7 and scholars in
behavioural law and economics8 have become interested in forms of
informal law that often regulate behaviour as much as, or more than,
official governmental pronouncements. And legal and political theorists
have sometimes focused on so-called ‘soft law’ instruments and their
real—if informal—effect on behaviour.9
In recent decades, a new application of pluralist insights has emerged
in the international and transnational realm. This new legal pluralism
research was born in the decades following the collapse of the bi-polar
Cold War order in 1989. During this period, it became clear that a
single-minded focus on state-to-state relations or universal overarching
norms was inadequate to describe the reality of the emerging global legal
system, with its web of jurisdictional assertions by state, international,
and non-state normative communities. As one commentator put it:
The nation-state and the interstate system are the central political forms of the
capitalist world system, and they will probably remain so for the foreseeable
future. What has happened, however, is that they have become an inherently
contested terrain, and this is the central new fact on which the analysis must
focus: the state and the interstate system as complex social fields in which
3 See, e.g., JN Figgis, Churches in the Modern State (London, Longmans,
Green, 1913).
4 See, e.g., FW Maitland, ‘Trust and Corporation’ in HD Hazeltine, G
Lapsley, PH Winfield (eds), Maitland: Selected Essays (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1936) 141-222.
5 See, e.g., L Benton and RJ Ross (eds), Legal Pluralism and Empires,
1500-1850 (New York, New York University Press, 2013).
6 See, e.g., L Pospisil, ‘Modern and Traditional Administration of Justice in
New Guinea’ (1981) 19 Journal of Legal Pluralism 93.
7 See, e.g., RC Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle
Disputes (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1991).
8 See, e.g., C Jolls, C Sunstein and R Thaler, ‘A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics’ (1998) 50 Stanford Law Review 1471.
9 See, e.g., C Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule
Making in the 21st Century, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2015).
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state and non-state, local and global social relations interact, merge and
conflict in dynamic and even volatile combinations.10
Legal pluralism provided a useful alternative framework because plural-
ism had always sought to identify hybrid legal spaces, where multiple
normative systems occupied the same social field. And though pluralists
had often focused on clashes within one geographical area, where formal
bureaucracies encountered indigenous ethnic, tribal, institutional or reli-
gious norms, the pluralist lens proved highly adaptive to analysis of the
hybrid legal spaces created by a different set of overlapping jurisdictional
assertions (state v. state; state v. international body; state v. non-state
entity) in the global arena.
An emphasis on legal pluralism also freed scholars from endless
intractable debates about whether international law is truly law given that
coercive enforcement power in the international and transnational arena
is often indirect or non-existent. Such debates had created stagnation in
the international law and international relations literature as both inter-
national law triumphalists and nation-state sovereigntists talked past each
other with either an overly formalist faith in international law’s inherent
authority, on the one hand, or an overly formalist rejection of any law
beyond the nation-state, on the other.
Global legal pluralism applies the insights of socio-legal scholarship
and turns the gaze away from abstract questions of legitimacy and
towards empirical questions of efficacy. Thus, pluralists de-emphasize the
supposed distinctions between a norm, a custom, a law, a moral com-
mand, a sociological consensus, a psychological imperative, or the like.
Instead, a pluralist approach focuses on whether people in actual practice
perceive such legal or quasi-legal commands to be binding, how these
commands seep into consciousness over time, and whether the mere
existence of these commands alters the power dynamics or options placed
on the table in policy discussions. Of course, questions of legitimacy and
efficacy are inextricably linked (see Roughan in this volume), but the
point is that once we come to recognize multiple sources of transnational
and non-state authority, it is difficult to maintain any single abstract
conception of legal authority. At best, authority is always relative and
always contested, and our models for describing law should reflect that
pluralism.
Finally, global legal pluralism has both a descriptive and normative
component. Anthropologists and historians have generally framed the
10 B de S Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization,
and Emancipation (London, Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002) 94.
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study of legal pluralism in descriptive terms. Accordingly, they have
catalogued the inevitable hybridity that arises when two legal or quasi-
legal systems occupy the same social space, as well as the resulting
strategic interactions that occur among actors in navigating the multiple
regimes. As a descriptive enterprise, legal pluralism is relatively un-
controversial. After all, even the most die-hard sovereigntist would likely
acknowledge that sub-, supra-, or non-state normative systems do impose
real constraints that have real impacts. More controversial is the idea that
legal pluralism might be a normatively desirable approach to the design
of legal systems.
As a normative project, legal pluralism can be seen to support two
different strategies. First, what we might call substantive legal pluralism
generally seeks maximal accommodation of alternative norms, at least in
certain delineated spheres. This is essentially a multiculturalist project,
and it sometimes runs up against objections that it defers too much to
illiberal norms. Second, a more proceduralist vision of legal pluralism
aims to design procedural mechanisms, institutions, and discursive prac-
tices that seek to manage pluralism, without making a priori substantive
decisions regarding when deference to alternative norms is appropriate
and when it is not. This proceduralist version of legal pluralism’s
normative project argues that the mechanisms, institutions, and practices
that result may at times be preferable to either sovereigntist territorialism
on the one hand, or universal harmonization on the other. Moreover, such
a proceduralist version of legal pluralism, unlike the substantive version,
need not commit one to a programme of inevitable deference even to
illiberal norms. Nevertheless, this proceduralist approach, precisely
because it refuses to engage with some of the most contentious substan-
tive political battles over when deference is appropriate and when it is
impossible, may be distrusted or rejected by those on both sides of the
pluralism debate who want more substantive normative certainty.
II. GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM AND THE CONCEPT
OF AUTHORITY
Instead of focusing on states, pluralists tend to think in terms of multiple
authorities. Moreover, they realize that all authority is inevitably only
relative, not absolute, and all the more so given the increasing number of
transnational and non-state claims to authority. In such a world, a
burgeoning collection of authorities inevitably overlaps, interacts, negoti-
ates, and accommodates. These authorities inhabit jurisdictional spheres
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that are often contested, and so the goal of most pluralist projects, at root
level, is to describe and conceptualize the interactions.
This idea of relative authority, however, immediately sets up a theoret-
ical conundrum because at least some conceptions of authority depend as
a definitional matter on that authority being absolute, not relative. Indeed,
some argue that a relative authority is not a true authority at all. For
example, Joseph Raz, in The Authority of Law, argues that central to ‘the
uniqueness of law’ is law’s claim to comprehensive authority and
supremacy.11 According to Raz, ‘Since all legal systems claim to be
supreme with respect to their subject-community, none can acknowledge
any claim to supremacy over the same community which may be made
by another legal system.’12
The problem is that even if Raz’s approach were supportable as an
abstract philosophical matter (itself a debatable assumption), an absolut-
ist conception of legal authority is often simply inadequate to fully
describe or analyse the transnational world of tangled legal and quasi-
legal obligations and influences we see around us. Not surprisingly,
pluralists challenge such a conception. Most recently, Nicole Roughan, in
Authorities, directly addresses Raz’s argument that a legal system by its
nature must claim supremacy over other legal systems. To Roughan,
Raz’s argument suffers from both empirical and analytical difficulties.
As an empirical matter, she argues that the supremacy claim runs
counter to actual legal practice, at least in Europe, which features ‘many
prima facie legal systems, including those of municipal states, that do not
claim supremacy over all others, or even claim subjection to others’.13
Other pluralists agree. For example, Nico Krisch surveys what he calls
‘the pluralist structure of postnational law’, finding, in instance after
instance, a more fluid framework that has no categorical separation
among legal spheres, but that also does not fully merge them or even
define ‘the degree of authority’ that the norms of these different spheres
actually possess.14 Likewise, Keith Culver and Michael Giudice detail
many areas where legal hierarchies are not stable, including federal and
11 J Raz, The Authority of Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2011) 117–21.
12 Ibid 119.
13 N Roughan, Authorities: Conflicts, Cooperation and Transnational Legal
Theory (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) 155.
14 N Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Post-
national Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010) 12. See also Krisch’s
chapter in this volume.
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quasi-federal states, as well as states that maintain domains of overlap
among concurrent authorities.15
Turning to Raz’s more fundamental, analytical claim, Roughan argues
that what pluralists need to develop, in order to combat Raz’s monist
conception, is an ‘account of law that explains how different supremacy
claims can be integrated and mutually recognized while upholding the
authority of law’.16 Her idea of relative authority aims to provide such an
account. She argues that a legal system need not recognize another
system as superior; it only needs to ‘recognize the relativity of its own
claim to the claim of others, and of their claims to its own’.17 Thus,
instead of seeing supremacy as a necessary precondition to law, Roughan
offers a model of relative authorities that must ‘cooperate, coordinate, or
tolerate one another if they are to have legitimacy’.18 In this model, the
claim to legitimate authority actually occurs through interdependence and
interaction. The result is not that authority is reduced. Rather, the claim
to authority is actually inextricably linked to its interdependence with
other similarly relative authorities.
The pluralist model of relative overlapping authorities, therefore, is not
necessarily a claim that traditional municipal legal systems have dimin-
ished authority in the 21st century (though that might be true in some
circumstances). Accordingly, one does not need to believe that nation-
states have become irrelevant in order to embrace a pluralist perspective.
To the contrary, their relevance is now bound up in their ability to
negotiate pluralism. Thus, when Krisch and others describe a ‘post-
national’ order, it is not because they believe that we are done with
nation-states. But what we might be done with is the (perhaps always
fictitious) idealized vision of the nation-state as a single authority
operating autonomously within bounded territory. ‘Post’ in this case,
means ‘after’, but not in the sense of nation-states no longer existing;
instead we are ‘after’ the nation-state only in the sense of being after a
particular moment when nation-states were conceptualized in an autono-
mous absolutist way.
Indeed, sometimes a claim to relative authority may actually be
stronger than a similar claim to absolute authority. For example, Krisch
describes instances when lower courts within European countries have
invoked the authority of the European Court of Human Rights to increase
15 K Culver and M Giudice, Legality’s Borders: An Essay in General
Jurisprudence (New York, Oxford University Press, 2010).
16 Roughan 2013, above n 13, 157.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid 8.
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their own authority within the domestic judicial system.19 In such cases,
by intertwining their authority with others they may actually increase
their authority rather than reduce it. Likewise a private arrangement
created by non-state actors can build authority by imbricating its regime
with state entities. Conversely, nation-states can sometimes piggy-back
on the superior enforcement power of non-state entities in order to
effectuate claims to authority. In all of these cases, mastering the
negotiation among relative authorities can actually increase power. Thus,
the nation-state may emerge just as powerful as before or even more so,
but it will derive its authority not from its autonomy but from its
relationships with other authorities.
III. GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM AND NON-STATE
AUTHORITIES
Those other authorities, while they can be state-based, also include a
much broader set of possible jurisdictional entities, some associated with
the state and some not. For example, many associations ‘claim to
possess—and attempt to exercise—a measure of legitimate authority over
their members, and assert that this authority does not derive from the
magnanimity of a liberal and tolerant state but is grounded, rather, on the
common practices and aspirations of those individuals who choose to
take part in a common endeavor’.20
If such plural sources of authority exist, then as Victor Muñiz-Fraticelli
has recently argued, ‘some of the central claims of republicanism must be
false, or at least be subject to perpetual contestation’.21 This is because
‘any sufficiently strong loyalty to any group but the political community
would prevent the state’s monopolistic exercise of sovereignty’.22 To
pluralists, this is potentially a ‘salutary effect of pluralism’,23 but then
what to do if an illiberal association or community pursues rights-
denying or otherwise destructive agendas? How does a state respond in
such circumstances?
19 N Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (2008)
71 Modern Law Review 183.
20 V Muñiz-Fraticelli, The Structure of Pluralism: On the Authority of
Associations (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 1.
21 Ibid 4.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
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Different strands of pluralism provide different answers to this ques-
tion. Some introduce a variation on the idea of judgment recognition. The
idea here is that, although a community might be free to articulate a norm
and apply it within its sphere, that does not necessarily mean others will
blindly follow, recognize, or enforce the norm, particularly if it violates
fundamental norms or values of the enforcing community. This concep-
tion of judgment recognition potentially helps prevent the spread of a
noxious idea, but it might nevertheless seem to leave the community free
to pursue its agenda within its own ‘private’ sphere. For example, a
liberal state might create a space for sharia law to be practised within
certain enclaves, while refusing to recognize and enforce such norms for
non-members of the enclaves. Such an arrangement, however, still raises
the question of whether such a policy commits the state to accept any and
all judgments and punishments the court might mete out even within the
enclave?
Some pluralists would say yes. For example, Alexis Galán and Denis
Patterson have argued against a relatively moderate and restrained
argument I made in my monograph, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurispru-
dence of Law Beyond Borders. I suggested that liberal communities
might try to open limited space for sharia courts to operate so long as
those courts do not trench upon fundamental values of the liberal
community. And it should be noted that even that moderate and
restrained version of the argument draws fire from critics across the
political spectrum, from rights advocates worried about illiberal practices
to nation-state sovereigntists worried about giving any authority at all to
non-state community ties. Patterson and Galán, in contrast, want to push
much further. They claim that it’s not really pluralism unless I go all the
way and advocate that liberal communities allow sharia courts to operate
regardless of whether or not they violate fundamental values of the
liberal community.24 This strikes me as unnecessarily extreme. Just
because one embraces insights from legal pluralism, after all, does not
mean that the values of pluralism must necessarily and always trump any
other values a community might hold. It simply cannot be that legal
pluralism is only a true normative position if it is pursued to the
exclusion of all other values, interests, and commitments.
Other pluralists also push back against the extreme view Galán and
Patterson suggest. They envision the relationship of state and association
24 A Galán and D Patterson, ‘The Limits of Normative Legal Pluralism:
Review of Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law
Beyond Borders’ (2013) 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 783.
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as one of reciprocal deference, not mutual independence and antagonism.
The state recognizes it cannot fully dictate or control, and so instead
relies on ‘policies that set incentives or encourage alternative sources of
public goods’.25 In turn, associations ‘should accept certain normative
conditions for reciprocal attenuation of conflict’.26 Dwight Newman has
even gone so far as to lay out a mutuality principle that an association
must obey: ‘a collectivity’s claims to rights must be respectful of
equivalently weighty interests of non-members’.27
The problem with principles such as Newman’s, as attractive as they
are, is that they still assume that it is a liberal state that has the authority
or simply the power to make judgments regarding the application of the
mutuality principle. That might be true when a non-state community
claims limited autonomy within a powerful liberal state. But pluralism
encompasses many areas of the globe where the state is absent or where
the power to enforce is at the very least shared between the state and
other entities that may contest the state’s legitimacy. In those circum-
stances, there may be little or no way of enforcing a mutuality principle,
and the judgment recognition regime described above may be the best we
can do.
IV. GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM AND CONFLICT OF
LAWS
The rise of global legal pluralism has brought renewed focus to the core
principles of conflict of laws (sometimes called private international
law): jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition of judgments. In a
world of multiple legal and quasi-legal pronouncements, these doctrines
become a core way of navigating the interactions, using principles that
derive from both legal formalism and political practicality. As Ralf
Michaels observes, if the reality we face is legal fragmentation, the
discipline most suited to deal with conflicts among legal orders is ‘the
discipline that was made for that precise purpose’.28 Along the same
lines, Christian Joerges has conceptualized the European Union as a
25 Muñiz-Fraticelli 2014, above n 20, 4.
26 Ibid.
27 D Newman, Community and Collective Rights: A Theoretical Framework
for Rights Held by Groups (Oxford, Hart, 2011) 131.
28 R Michaels, ‘Post-critical Private International Law: From Politics to
Technique’ in H Muir Watt and D Fernández-Arroyo (eds), Private International
Law and Global Governance (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 54–67.
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conflict-of-laws regime.29 And Gunther Teubner has called for a radical
reshaping of conflict of laws to address conflicts among societal systems,
not just laws.30
It is true that conflicts doctrines cannot definitively solve problems of
legal pluralism. Indeed, every historical effort to establish rules to resolve
such conflicts has run into unsolvable problems, both theoretical and
practical. So perhaps the field of conflicts of law is not really a stable
legal doctrine at all? Is it just a matter of political choice dressed up in
legal clothing? Of course, that is a charge potentially leveled at all legal
doctrine and not without some truth behind it.
But just because politics inevitably pervades law does not mean legal
doctrine is irrelevant or has no impact. And in the realm of conflict of
laws, simply conceiving of a battle between state and non-state law in
terms of conflicts doctrine will tend to change the framework of decision.
Because non-state law-making is not usually conceived of as law, we do
not often think of clashes between state and non-state law through the
prism of conflict-of-laws jurisprudence. But we could. By way of
example, consider two classic US constitutional cases that are usually
framed as issues of religious or ethnic toleration, but which can also be
analysed in terms of choice of law.
First, in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,31 the Internal Revenue
Service had interpreted section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,
which gives tax-exempt status to qualifying charitable institutions, to
apply to schools only if such schools have a ‘racially nondiscriminatory
policy as to students’. Accordingly, the Service denied tax exemption to
Bob Jones University, which had not admitted blacks at all until 1971
and had admitted them thereafter but had forbidden interracial dating,
interracial marriage, the espousal of violation of these prohibitions, and
membership in groups that advocated interracial marriage. Crucial to the
case was the fact that the University grounded its rule not on racial
attitudes, but on Biblical scripture. The school therefore considered the
exclusion of interracial dating to be a principal tenet of its religious
community. Nevertheless, although the text of section 501(c)(3) did not
speak to racial discrimination at all, the Supreme Court upheld the IRS
29 C Joerges, ‘Reconceptualizing the Supremacy of European Law: A Plea
for a Supranational Conflict of Laws’ in B Kohler-Koch and B Rittberger (eds),
Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union (New York,
Rowman & Littlefield, 2007) 311–27.
30 G Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System, transl. A Bankowska and R
Adler (Oxford, Blackwell, 1993).
31 461 US 574 (1983).
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determination, finding the service’s interpretation of the Code provision
to be permissible.
Robert Cover famously criticized the reasoning of the Bob Jones
decision, even while agreeing with the Court’s result. According to
Cover, the Court assumed ‘a position that places nothing at risk and from
which the Court makes no interpretive gesture at all, save the quint-
essential gesture to the jurisdictional canons: the statement that an
exercise of political authority was not unconstitutional’.32 In particular,
Cover argued that, by grounding its decision on an interpretation of the
Internal Revenue Code, the Court had side-stepped the crucial constitu-
tional question of whether Congress could grant tax exemptions to
schools that discriminated on the basis of race. This was a problem for
Cover because he believed that if a state legal authority were going to
‘kill off’ the competing normative commitment of an alternative com-
munity, it should do so based on a profound normative commitment of its
own. By avoiding the constitutional question, Cover complained, the
Court had both undermined the religious community—whose normative
commitments would be placed at the mercy of mere public policy
judgments—and at the same time undermined racial minorities—who
‘deserved a constitutional commitment to avoiding public subsidization
of racism’.33
In contrast, had the clash between the University’s religious rule and
the IRS Code, or between the religious rule and the US Constitution,
been viewed as a choice-of-law decision, two aspects of the case would
have been clarified. First, the Court would have analyzed and defined the
relevant community affiliations at stake. Second, the Court would have
been forced to grapple with the strength of its commitment to the
principle of non-discrimination, just as Cover urged. As a result, instead
of simply asserting federal law, a conflicts analysis encourages negoti-
ation among the different norms advanced by different communities.
A more pluralist vision of conflict of laws recognizes that people and
groups hold multiple community affiliations and takes those affiliations
seriously. Thus, when a non-state legal practice is largely internal and
primarily reflects individuals’ affiliation with the non-state community,
the practice should be given more leeway than when the state itself is
part of the relevant affiliation. In this case, the issue at stake was a tax
exemption, a quintessentially state matter. Indeed, Bob Jones University
32 RM Cover, ‘The Supreme Court, 1982 Term – Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative’ (1983) 97 Harvard Law Review 4.
33 Ibid 67.
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was asking for a particular benefit for charitable organizations that was
contained in the US tax code. Therefore, for these purposes the place of
the university within the nation-state was the most salient tie, making
application of the federal law more justifiable. In contrast, as we shall
see, other non-state normative commitments do not implicate the nation-
state so directly.
Moreover, even if the relevant community tie were largely with the
religious community itself, certain norms might be held so strongly by
the nation-state community that such norms would be applied regardless
of the community affiliation. In choice-of-law analysis, this is usually
called the public policy exception, and it allows courts to refuse to apply
foreign law that would otherwise apply, if those legal norms are
sufficiently repugnant. But application of the public policy exception is
rare, both as a normative and descriptive matter. Thus, if a court asserts
such an exception, it must justify the use of public policy grounds by
reference to precisely the sorts of deeply held commitments that Cover
envisioned. In the Bob Jones case, for example, it might be that the
nation-state’s deep commitment to eradicating racial discrimination
would independently justify overriding the religious norms, regardless of
the community affiliation analysis.
Accordingly, a conflicts approach would not simply throw the claim of
protected religious insularity to the mercy of political or bureaucratic
judgments. Taking the ban on interracial dating seriously as law and
performing a choice-of-law analysis would create the obligation to
engage in crucial line-drawing. And, while the community affiliation and
public policy exception analyses in this case might justify application of
state law, that will not always be the case.
Consider, by way of contrast, Employment Div., Dept. of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith,34 in which the Supreme Court refused to
extend First Amendment protection to the religious use of peyote by a
tribal community. Here, unlike the tax exemption at issue in Bob Jones,
the tribe was not negotiating its relationship with the state; rather the use
of peyote was part of a purely internal religious practice open primarily
(or exclusively) to members of that community. Thus, a choice-of-law
analysis based on community affiliation might well result in deference to
the non-state norm. Moreover, the normative commitment to drug
enforcement is perhaps better characterized as a governance choice than
as an inexorable normative command. As such, the public policy excep-
tion is arguably less appropriate in this context than when addressing
34 494 US 872 (1990).
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racial discrimination. Applying these principles, a choice-of-law analysis
might well have permitted the religious practice in Smith.
In the end, however, I am less concerned with the outcome in
particular cases than with the analytical framework employed. Conceiv-
ing of these clashes between religious and state law in conflicts terms
reorients the inquiry in a way that takes more seriously the non-state
community assertion. As a result, courts must wrestle both with the
nature of the multiple community affiliations potentially at issue and with
the need to articulate truly strong normative justifications for not defer-
ring to the non-state norm. Both consequences make the choice-of-law
decision a constructive terrain of engagement among multiple normative
systems, rather than an arm of state government automatically and
without reflection imposing its normative vision on all within its coercive
power. In a similar vein, Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels, and Annelise Riles
describe conflict of laws doctrines not as truly fixed rules that dictate
outcomes, but as technique: a discursive framework that structures
thought.35
We can also usefully evaluate judicial opinions, legacies, and philoso-
phies through the lens of legal pluralism by considering how judges try to
navigate conflicts among legal systems. This interpretive lens focuses
less on substantive outcome or political labels such as liberal or con-
servative and more on the way in which the judge understands his or her
role in an interlocking, multijurisdictional legal tapestry. And given that
judges inevitably face questions involving the interaction of legal sys-
tems, we can legitimately ask how each judge seeks to negotiate the
hybrid spaces that result. Thus, a pluralist framework provides an
untapped means of considering jurisprudential legacies. For example,
examining Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s work as professor, judge and
justice through a pluralist lens reveals a consistent theme in Ginsburg’s
jurisprudence.36 Across a variety of substantive legal areas, Ginsburg
often chooses a path that provides maximum play among the legal
systems at issue. Beginning with her earliest scholarly writings, she has
tended to oppose doctrines allowing one legal system to block another
from adjudicating a dispute, and throughout her later career Ginsburg
likewise has tended to reject bright-line rules that choose one legal
35 K Knop, R Michaels and A Riles, ‘From Multiculturalism to Technique:
Feminism, Culture, and the Conflict of Laws Style’ (2012) 64 Stanford Law
Review 589.
36 PS Berman, ‘Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Interaction of Legal Systems’
in S Dodson (ed), The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg (New York, Cambridge
University Press, 2015) 151–71.
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system over another. Instead, she often seems to prefer procedural
arrangements that seek accommodation and flexibility in order to ensure
that multiple legal systems and a variety of norms and processes are
respected. Thus, an emphasis on mechanisms for managing pluralism
illuminates tendencies in her judicial approach that otherwise may have
escaped notice. Similar analyses of other judges or the effects of different
jurisprudential approaches may well follow over time.
V. GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Given that global legal pluralism has increasingly focused on procedural
mechanisms and institutional designs for managing the interactions of
legal systems, it is not at all surprising that those interested in global
constitutionalism have at times embraced insights from legal pluralism.
Such scholars seek structures to guide constitutive systemic interactions
beyond the nation-state, and pluralism can offer a helpful rubric for
building such structures. On the other hand, because pluralism tends to
emphasize procedures rather than substantive norms, those seeking a
more robust set of transnational constitutional normative commitments
may reject or challenge what they view as the weak pull of pluralism.
The move to marry constitutionalism and pluralism has arisen princi-
pally in the context of European integration.37 As far back as 1995, Neil
MacCormick used pluralism to provide an alternative constitutional
vision to the then-prevalent internationalist position that emphasized the
inherent supremacy of pan-European institutions. In justifying the
Maastricht decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court, Mac-
Cormick suggested that unconditional acceptance of European Court of
Justice decisions was not the only possible way to conceive of the
increasingly integrated union. Instead, MacCormick argued that:
The most appropriate analysis of the relations of legal systems is pluralistic
rather than monistic, and interactive rather than hierarchical. The legal system
of Member States and their common legal system of EC law are distinct but
interacting systems of law, and hierarchical relationships of validity within
37 E.g., M Avbelj and J Komárek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the
European Union and Beyond (Oxford, Hart, 2012).
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criteria of validity proper to distinct systems do not add up to any sort of
all-purpose superiority of one system over another.38
Subsequently, MacCormick, in Questioning Sovereignty, laid out the
basic tenets of a theory of European constitutional pluralism: plural
normative orders each acknowledging the legitimacy of the others, and
none asserting superiority.39
Neil Walker generalized the idea of constitutional pluralism beyond the
European context.40 Walker argued that the Westphalian state no longer
held a monopoly of legitimate authority and that the world was better
conceptualized as a site of contestation among multiple authorities with
no Archimedian point from which conflicting claims to authority can be
reconciled. Thus, according to Walker, we are better served by seeking a
constitutional discourse built on mutual recognition and respect for other
potential law-making authorities.
Significantly, as Walker’s work makes clear, legal pluralism provides a
way to invigorate constitutional discourse by reorienting it away from the
structure of a single state and towards a discussion of how to manage
constitutive interactions among multiple normative systems. In an era of
fragmented and relative authority, one might think that constitutions no
longer matter as much. But that is only if we think of constitutionalism as
solely the province of states and their internal institutions. If instead we
see constitutionalism as setting the ground-rules for interaction among
relative authorities, constitutionalism becomes more important than ever.
As Matej Avbelj and Jan Komárek have recently argued, ‘[t]he world
pervaded by plurality … calls for a meta-language through which the
actors situated at different (epistemic) sites could reflexively engage with
each other by recognizing their differences with a simultaneous commit-
ment to a certain shared framework of co-existence.’41 Constitutional
pluralism potentially provides such a meta-language.
A pluralist framework recognizes that normative conflict is unavoid-
able and so, instead of trying to erase conflict, seeks to manage it through
procedural mechanisms, institutions and practices that might at least draw
the participants to the conflict into a shared social space. But what
38 N MacCormick, ‘The Maastricht Urteil: Sovereignty Now’ (1995) 1
European Law Journal 259, 265.
39 N MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the
European Commonwealth (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999).
40 N Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 Modern Law
Review 317. See also Walker’s chapter in this volume.
41 Avbelj and Komárek 2012, above n 37, 4.
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norms, procedures or institutional arrangements actually follow from an
embrace of pluralism? Here, at least in the European context, we see a
great divergence of opinion that can usefully be grouped into seven
strands of thought.42
First, Joseph Weiler has argued that, as a sociological matter, Europe at
least is already acting on a pluralist constitutional base.43 According to
Weiler, the European Union is founded on principles of mutual recog-
nition and institutional deference and tolerance. Further, those principles
are played out in the day-to-day decisions of all actors in the system,
from low-level bureaucrats to high-level judicial authorities. Thus, Weiler
argues that no further written constitutional document is necessary and
that the norms such a document would inculcate already permeate the
system. Weiler surfaces an important point that pluralists historically
have adopted but that some constitutional pluralists may have forgotten:
law exists in everyday practice and legal consciousness, not only in
hierarchically determined formal legal structures. Accordingly, what we
always need to study are the habits of mind that decision-makers and
everyday people exhibit, regardless of the existence or non-existence of
formal rules. From this perspective, Weiler is surely right that there can
be a constitution in practice without a written document. On the other
hand, it is also the case that formal structures and documents can, over
time, come to influence habits of mind and day-to-day practices as part
of a recursive feedback loop from doctrine to practice and back again.
Second, Walker’s brand of constitutional pluralism resists some of the
hierarchical dimensions of European integration far more than Weiler
does. He therefore insists that the principles of mutual recognition and
toleration be more formally built into the procedural mechanisms and
structural documents of the EU. Thus, Walker is not willing to accept that
pluralism is already sufficiently embedded in the structure of Europe.
Rather he wants a more active and intentional engagement with the idea
of constitutional pluralism.44
42 E.g., ibid; K Jaklic, Constitutional Pluralism in the EU (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2014).
43 JHH Weiler, ‘In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe’s Constitutional
Sonderweg’ in JHH Weiler and M Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism
Beyond the State (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003) 7–24.
44 E.g., N Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context’ in
Avbelj and Komárek 2012, above n 37, 17–37.
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Third, some global constitutionalists, such as Mattias Kumm,45 are
sceptical about pluralism’s relentless focus on procedure and structure
and therefore its resistance to articulating overarching substantive norms.
According to Kumm, a pluralism aimed at fostering dialogue, tolerance,
and mutual recognition is already sub rosa insisting on liberal norms and
values even if it refuses to say so. Therefore, he argues, we should be
explicit in championing a universal framework of shared liberal values
including core norms of human rights and political participation. Here we
see the flip side of the critique that Galán and Patterson advance, which
was recounted earlier. Whereas Galán and Patterson criticize global legal
pluralism for being too much like liberalism and therefore not pluralist
enough, Kumm asks pluralists to embrace their liberal universalism and
push further to actually advocate for global substantive constitutional
values. The question, therefore, for global legal pluralists is whether
there’s a coherent middle ground between these two positions, one that
embraces values of procedural and institutional interaction while honour-
ing plural norms and resisting a universal framework of hierarchically
imposed rights.
Fourth, we might see Miguel Maduro as trying to thread that very
needle.46 He repeatedly resists making strong claims about universal
substantive norms while simultaneously requiring overarching procedural
norms that require actors to justify their claims to authority. In this
requirement (and in much global legal pluralist literature), we can hear
echoes of Jürgen Habermas’ discourse-based liberal theory. The question
remains, though, whether the middle ground can be maintained. I believe
it can. After all, even if one insists ultimately on an overarching norm of
dialogue and toleration, that minimalist liberalism may be more palatable
to those embracing competing views than the more robust package of
substantive liberal rights advocated by Kumm. Thus, acknowledging a
liberal core to global legal pluralism does not commit one to adopting
every liberal substantive norm and then insisting on universal adoption of
the entire package.
Fifth, we might include those who accept—or even celebrate—a
limited range of plural systemic interaction even while tolerating (or
advocating) a hierarchical legal order. Thus, in the United States many
45 E.g., M Kumm, ‘Rethinking Constitutional Authority: On the Structure
and Limits of Constitutional Pluralism’ in Avbelj and Komárek 2012, above n 37,
39–65.
46 E.g., MP Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism
in Action’ in N Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford, Hart, 2003)
501–38.
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who would in no way identify with pluralism nevertheless acknowledge
the importance of state-based pluralism within a federalist legal structure.
And even committed pluralists such as Robert Cover have celebrated
federalism for allowing ‘tensions and conflicts of the social order’ to be
played out in the jurisdictional structure of the system.47 Likewise,
advocates of federalism emphasize the importance of having a multi-
layered, quasi-independent legal system, and they have sometimes
applied such an approach to the supranational arena (at least within
Europe).48 But such multi-level constitutionalism tends to presuppose a
hierarchically superior European sovereign that ultimately provides a
single answer to constitutional conflict. Thus, its pluralism is sharply
circumscribed.
Sixth, there are those who believe that supranational integration along
constitutionalist lines is an impossibility. Instead, they argue for a
‘directly deliberative polyarchy’ that explicitly recognizes plural law-
making authority by an overlapping network of private and public actors
and bodies.49 This can hardly be called constitutionalism at all. Indeed,
advocates of this approach argue that instead of thinking in constitution-
alist terms we should be exploring ways in which the pluralist inter-
actions among state and non-state regulatory bodies can be made more
responsive, inclusive, and democratic.
Finally, there are those, such as Gunther Teubner, who see a global
societal constitutionalism emerging through the interaction of social
systems.50 This approach is more of a descriptive sociological project
than a normative matter of political theory. But it effectively challenges
all theories of global constitutionalism to recognize the real sources of
power and authority at play in the world and the fact that the sources of
that power and authority may in the end have nothing to do with any
political theory of constitutional legitimacy, even pluralist ones.
47 RM Cover, ‘The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology,
and Innovation’ (1981) 22 William and Mary Law Review 639, 682.
48 E.g., D Halberstam, ‘Systems Pluralism and Institutional Pluralism in
Constitutional Law: National, Supranational and Global Governance’ in Avbelj
and Komárek 2012, above n 37, 85–125; S Piattoni, The Theory of Multi-Level
Governance: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2010).
49 E.g., O Gerstenberg and C Sabel, ‘Directly Deliberative Polyarchy: An
Institutional Ideal for Europe?’ in C Joerges and R Dehousse (eds), Good
Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2002) 289–341.
50 G Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and
Globalization (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014).
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Thus, we can see that legal pluralism has usefully broadened the
discourse about constitutionalism, especially in Europe. Whereas consti-
tutions were historically the province of states and were most celebrated
for the substantive rights recognized, the pluralist discourse turns the
discussion to managing structural interactions among law-making entities
on the state, sub-state, and supra-national level. This discussion has
already borne significant fruit, both in the realm of scholarship and in the
actual practice of institutions, where we see many structures and proced-
ural mechanisms that embed pluralist principles into their constitutive
frameworks. Such institutions, structures and mechanisms include
coordinated judicial dialogue, margins of appreciation, hybrid tribunals,
subsidiarity regimes, formal spheres for religious law, and so on.51 Over
time, we can expect to see this discourse grow and to see more
institutions built and procedural mechanisms developed with an explicit
pluralist framework at their core.
On the other hand, perhaps we should move the whole constitutional
debate beyond constitutionalism itself. After all, as Nico Krisch52
observes, the core idea of constitutionalism is grounded in the effort to
define a ‘people’ or demos that can plausibly be tasked with self-
government. This effort might possibly be successful in the European
context (though even there we see much cause for doubt), but it is far
more difficult to imagine such a constitutionalism ever emerging glob-
ally, given the diversity that exists. Moreover, as Krisch argues, ‘in these
circumstances, the idea of settling the central questions of a polity in
constitutionalist form may not only seem unachievable but also
undesirable—respect for this diversity may require leaving those ques-
tions open, rather than closing the debate’.53 Accordingly, Krisch asks us
to break out of the ‘straitjacket that accompanies the quest for continuity
with domestic concepts and traditions’. Instead, he suggests looking
‘beyond constitutionalism for guidance and inspiration’. From Krisch’s
perspective pluralism is an alternative to global constitutionalism, not a
set of principles that can be incorporated within constitutional discourse.
I am sympathetic with Krisch’s position, and I agree that pluralism
offers a radical critique of traditional constitutionalist thinking. However,
I also believe that, at least judging from the constitutionalist discourse of
the past 15 years, we are seeing the evolution of constitutionalism in a
more pluralist direction. Thus, rather than rejecting the constitutionalist
51 For a discussion of these and other mechanisms, see PS Berman, ‘Global
Legal Pluralism’ (2007) 80 Southern California Law Review 1155.
52 Krisch 2010, above n 14.
53 Ibid 68.
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discourse altogether, I would be more inclined to continue the engage-
ment and encourage the movement away from constitutionalism as
demos construction and towards a vision of constitutionalism that seeks
mechanisms and institutions that foster constitutive interaction among
systems. The resulting constitutionalist structures and institutions would
likely accord with Krisch’s vision, even if he would refuse to use the
label constitutionalist to describe them.
VI. GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM AND
COSMOPOLITANISM
Cosmopolitanism is often thought to be the opposite of pluralism because
cosmopolitanism is seen as a justification for universal overarching
norms that govern beyond and above the state. In this conception,
cosmopolitanism is equated with universalism, and if that is the defin-
ition of cosmopolitanism then it does seem to be antithetical to pluralism.
Certainly, from a pluralist perspective there are reasons to question both
the desirability and the feasibility of universalism, at least in some
contexts.
As to desirability, it is not at all clear that universalism is an unalloyed
good. Indeed, if we think of ourselves solely as citizens of the world, we
might tend to dissolve the multi-rootedness of community affiliation into
one global community. Thus, universalism may fail to capture the
extreme emotional ties people still feel to distinct transnational or local
communities and therefore ignore the very attachments people hold most
deeply.
In addition, universalism inevitably erases diversity. This is a problem
for three reasons. First, such erasure may involve the silencing of less
powerful voices. Thus, the presumed universal may also be the hege-
monic. Second, preserving legal diversity can be seen as a good in and of
itself because it means that multiple forms of regulatory authority can be
assayed in multiple local settings. Just as states in a federal system
function as ‘laboratories’ of innovation, so too the preservation of diverse
legal spaces makes innovation possible. Third, a legal system that
provides mechanisms for mediating diversity without dissolving differ-
ence necessarily also provides an important model for mediating diversity
in day-to-day social life. For example, one argument for a strongly
speech-protective interpretation of the First Amendment of the US
Constitution is that the effort required to tolerate the provocative speech
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of others is the same effort required to tolerate others more generally.54
Thus, a legal system that demands tolerance of diversity rather than its
erasure is more likely to create the context for a tolerant society than one
that, in contrast, seeks uniformity as its goal.
Nevertheless, even if one rejects these normative arguments and
embraces universalism as the appropriate path in the abstract, it is
difficult to believe that, as a practical matter, harmonization processes
will ever fully bridge the significant differences that exist among states,
let alone the variety of non-state orders at play in the world. This is
because many differences, both in substantive values and attitudes about
law, arise from fundamentally different histories, philosophies, and
worldviews. People are therefore likely to be either unable or unwilling
to trade in their perspectives for the sake of universal harmony. More-
over, even if they were so inclined, it would be difficult to develop a
process for determining which norms should be elevated to universal
status and which should give way. Thus, when harmonization is possible,
it is usually a slow, laborious undertaking, limited to codifying normative
convergences that have already occurred over time. As a result, harmon-
ization is generally backward-looking, and in a rapidly changing world,
harmonization processes will tend to lag behind social, technological, and
economic realities. Accordingly, even the most optimistic universalist
would have to acknowledge that normative conflict is at the very least a
constant transitional reality that will require hybrid processes to address.
But perhaps we can view cosmopolitanism as something different from
universalism. After all, cosmopolitanism does not necessarily require a
belief in a single global welfare or even a single universal set of
governing norms, nor does it necessarily require that global welfare
trump state welfare. Indeed, properly understood, cosmopolitanism need
not be incompatible with pluralism. To the contrary, a more nuanced
understanding of cosmopolitan theory offers a useful framework for
conceptualizing the interplay of multiple actors in the transnational
system we see operating today.
Cosmopolitanism is a useful trope for conceptualizing interaction
across territorial borders precisely because it recognizes that people have
multiple affiliations, extending from the local to the global (and many
non-territorial affiliations as well). For example, Martha Nussbaum has
stressed that cosmopolitanism does not require one to give up local
identifications, which, she acknowledges, ‘can be a source of great
54 E.g., TI Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment (New
York, Vintage, 1966).
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richness in life’.55 Rather, following the Stoics, she suggests that we
should think of ourselves as surrounded by a series of concentric circles:
The first one encircles the self, the next takes in the immediate family, then
follows the extended family, then, in order, neighbours or local groups, fellow
city-dwellers, and fellow countrymen—and we can easily add to this list
groupings based on ethnic, linguistic, historical, professional, gender, or
sexual identities. Outside all these circles is the largest one, humanity as a
whole.56
Therefore, we need not relinquish special affiliations and identifications
with the various groups of which we may feel a part.
In this vision, people could be ‘cosmopolitan patriots’, accepting their
responsibility to nurture the culture and politics of their home com-
munity, while at the same time recognizing that such cultural practices
are always shifting, as people move from place to place or are increas-
ingly affected by spatially distant actors.57 ‘The result would be a world
in which each local form of human life is the result of long-term and
persistent processes of cultural hybridization—a world, in that respect,
much like the world we live in now.’58
Thus, cosmopolitanism is emphatically not a model of international
citizenship in the sense of global harmonization and standardization, but
is instead a recognition of multiple refracted differences where people
acknowledge links with the ‘other’ without demanding assimilation or
ostracism. Cosmopolitanism seeks ‘flexible citizenship’, in which people
are permitted to shift identities amid a plurality of possible affiliations
and allegiances, including non-territorial communities.59 The cosmopol-
itan worldview shifts back and forth from the rooted particularity of
55 MC Nussbaum, ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’ in J Cohen (ed), For
Love of Country?: Debating the Limits of Patriotism (New York, Beacon, 2002)
3–17, 9.
56 Ibid.
57 KA Appiah, ‘Cosmopolitan Patriots’ in P Cheah and B Robbins (eds),
Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation (Minneapolis, Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, 1998) 91–116.
58 Ibid 92.
59 A Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality
(Durham NC, Duke University Press, 1999).
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personal identity to the global possibility of multiple overlapping com-
munities. ‘[I]nstead of an ideal of detachment, actually existing cosmo-
politanism is a reality of (re)attachment, multiple attachment, or
attachment at a distance.’60
In recent years, Patrick Glenn has offered a rich account of the role of
nation-states within this kind of multiplicity.61 He argues that there never
has been and never will be a nation-state that was not ultimately
cosmopolitan in character because all states exist as part of a world of
relative overlapping authorities. In the end, he argues that we should look
to the structural ways that states operate in and adapt to this cosmopol-
itan reality. And in doing so, he focuses on many of the same sorts of
procedures and institutions that global legal pluralism has explored over
the past two decades. A cosmopolitan pluralist conception of law,
therefore, might be seen to capture a middle ground between strict
territorialism on the one hand and expansive universalism on the other. A
territorialist approach fails to account for the wide variety of community
affiliations and social interactions that defy territorial boundaries. A more
universalist perspective, by contrast, which seeks to imagine people as
world citizens first and foremost, might seem to be a useful alternative.
But such universalism tends to presuppose a world citizenry devoid of
both particularist ties and normative discussion about the relative import-
ance of such ties. Thus, universalism cuts off debate about the nature of
overlapping communities just as surely as territorialism does.
A cosmopolitan pluralist conception, in contrast, makes no attempt to
deny the multi-rooted nature of individuals within a variety of com-
munities, both territorial and non-territorial. Thus, although a cosmopol-
itan pluralist conception might acknowledge the potential importance of
asserting universal norms in specific circumstances, it does not require a
universalist belief in a single world community. As a result, cosmopolitan
pluralism offers a promising rubric for analysing law in a world of
diverse normative voices.
Again, in this conception, cosmopolitanism and pluralism are in no
way at odds. Cosmopolitanism recognizes multiple affiliation and over-
lapping community identification as well as multiple legal systems,
whereas pluralism recognizes that these legal and quasi-legal systems can
include both state and non-state entities. Thus, the evolution of global
60 B Robbins, ‘Introduction: Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism’ in Cheah
and Robbins 1998, above n 57, 1–19, 3.
61 HP Glenn, The Cosmopolitan State (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2013).
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legal pluralism is fully compatible with cosmopolitan theory, at least as
understood in this more nuanced framework.
VII. GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
For many years, international law triumphalists hoped that the rise of
international legal institutions would resolve this messy world of regime
collision and fragmentation by creating one over-arching, hierarchically
superior set of norms that most people would follow most of the time.
And yet, precisely as legal pluralism scholarship would predict, the
hierarchy, once articulated, was immediately contested. Thus, inter-
national law, though it often has very real impact,62 ends up being one
voice among many, all competing for authority. In addition, again as legal
pluralism scholarship predicts, it quickly becomes clear that international
law itself is not one entity. Instead, different international legal regimes,
promulgated for very different reasons and administered by different
tribunals and regulatory bodies, often conflict and collide with each
other, leading to the need for negotiation, contestation and hybrid
provisional compromises.63
In response to this pluralism, we could bemoan the ‘fragmentation of
international law’64 and seek to stamp it out by trying to create rules of
recognition that would declare one legal regime to be superior. This
strikes me as a fool’s errand given the diversity of the world’s population.
Alternatively, we could celebrate the multiplicity and devise strategies for
managing, without eliminating, the inevitable pluralism around us. And if
we do so, we may find that law already provides a language and a set of
procedural mechanisms and discursive practices that might help negotiate
across the fissures.
For example, Dirk Pulkowski has recently explored how this negoti-
ation takes place in one particular substantive area: the regulation of trade
62 PS Berman, ‘Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law’ (2006) 84
Texas Law Review 1265.
63 MA Young (ed), Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Frag-
mentation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012).
64 E.g., M Koskenniemi, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ ILC, Study
Group on Fragmentation of International Law (2006) UN Doc A/CN4/L682.
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in cultural products.65 Pulkowski observes that such regulation may arise
from three distinct international regimes: the trade regime, the human
rights regime, and the UNESCO culture regime. As Pulkowski notes,
each of these three regimes may well promote ‘different, and ultimately
incommensurable, policy goals, such as open markets, diversity of
cultural identities, and equal opportunities for cultural participation in a
society’.66 So what happens when these regimes collide by pulling ‘in
different directions and towards different normative outcomes’? Each
regime has similar authority; none is hierarchically superior to the other
two. But does that mean that there is no possible response? Does the
resulting legal pluralism render efforts to negotiate among the regimes
useless?
Pulkowski thinks not. He argues instead that international law, even
when it does not offer a hierarchically superior set of normative rules,
provides interpretive strategies that can help develop what he calls
‘inter-regime compatibility’.67 Indeed, although international law is not
(and perhaps never will be) ‘an integrated and fully unified system’, it
can be ‘a common language for discursive engagement across regimes,
based on shared, regime-transcendent discourse rules’.68
What are these ‘regime-transcendent’ discourse rules? Not surprisingly,
Pulkowski here turns away from substantive norms because it will always
be difficult to choose a single set of such norms to govern. Instead, he
focuses on interpretive and procedural mechanisms, which at least have
the potential to forge provisional compromises among different normative
systems. He argues that ‘[i]nternational law plays a useful role in
bridging conflicting regimes’ in two ways.69 First, international law offers
canons of interpretation that can be used by actors within each of the
three regimes to try to interpret norms with an eye towards overall
systemic coherence. Second, if no systemic coherence is possible,
international conflict-of-law rules can be used to determine which
regime’s norms to apply (or whether, perhaps, a hybrid can be forged).
Jeffrey Dunoff likewise has responded to concerns about fragmentation
by playing out the question of regime interaction using the insights of
65 D Pulkowski, The Law and Politics of International Regime Conflict
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014).
66 Ibid 13.
67 Ibid 20.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
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legal pluralism.70 But he argues that we should look beyond the more
formal interactions and conflicts that Pulkowski emphasizes. Instead,
Dunoff suggests that we should see all the various international regimes
as norm-generating communities that interact in iterative ongoing rela-
tions, not in single discrete transactions.
For example, Dunoff analyses the international response to regulating
hazardous chemicals and other substances. These regulatory efforts, ‘have
been marked,’ he argues, ‘by collaborations among international organ-
izations that cross regimes’.71 Thus, the Inter-Organization Programme
for the Sound Management of Chemicals includes actors from the World
Health Organization, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International
Labour Organization, the United Nations Environment Programme, and
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, with the World
Bank and UN Development Programme participating as observers. The
members of these widely varying regimes interact regularly to build
broader regulatory initiatives. Likewise, The Stockholm Convention on
Persistent Organic Pollutants ‘explicitly structures an ongoing series of
interactions between actors in the chemicals regime … and actors in the
public health regime … over global efforts to create global regulations
for dangerous pesticides’.72 And even absent explicit treaty commands,
Dunoff highlights regime interactions such as the increasing dialogue
between the human rights and climate change communities. According to
Dunoff, this iterative relational process of norm creation is fundamentally
different from Pulkowski’s more transactional model that emphasizes
jurisdictional boundaries, conflicts of law, and individualized decision-
making. Instead, Dunoff describes the more inchoate ongoing conceptual
interactions that over time change broad-based coalitions and normative
understandings.
Both Pulkowski and Dunoff perform a useful service by playing out
their strategies in specific contexts and doing so in a theoretically
sophisticated and systematic way. This scholarship suggests that, in the
end, international law’s strength might be less its assertion of an absolute
set of governing norms and more its provision of a language and a
variety of forums for creative and fruitful contestation, compromise and
norm development.
70 JL Dunoff, ‘A New Approach to Regime Interation’ in Young 2012, above
n 63 136–74.
71 Ibid 159.
72 Ibid 161.
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VIII. GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM AND LIBERALISM
If one is interested in non-state law-making, one is, almost by definition,
drawn to legal pluralism (and global legal pluralism) as an interpretive
lens. This is because while liberal legal theorists generally presume that
state-based law trumps all competing normative systems, pluralists chal-
lenge the centrality of the state. Whether considering canon law or
indigenous law or the law of ethnic groups, pluralists have long refused to
accept that the state is the only relevant actor on the stage of law. As such,
those most interested in charting the influence and power of non-state
law-making have looked to legal pluralism as a possible solution to the
problem of traditional liberal legality’s state-centrism. And global legal
pluralism adds transnational and international normative assertions into
the mix, again challenging the presumed autonomy of state law.
But, when considering non-state actors and non-state law-making of
various kinds, what does a pluralist perspective actually add to the classic
liberal approach? After all, liberalism is not unalterably opposed to
non-state norms, and even those who focus only on the central legal
authority of the liberal state think it important that the state should
sometimes defer to such norms. Indeed, one of the core notions of
liberalism is that government should not take sides in debates about
competing visions of the good, and therefore space is allowed for non-state
normative commitments. So long as a non-state normative community
does not infringe unduly on the rights of others, liberalism allows those
communities a tremendous amount of freedom and scope. For their part
most pluralists do not deny the importance of the state, nor even the fact
that often the state has greater coercive power at its disposal and therefore
is better able to enforce its norms than non-state entities are. After all,
recognizing non-state law-making as important does not in and of itself
mean that all sources of law are equally powerful or influential.
So, on the surface, it appears that legal pluralism and legal liberalism
effectively merge into one. The merged statement reads something like
this: ‘The state is the most powerful lawmaker; it allows scope for
non-state norms when it chooses to, and it often does choose to defer
because non-state norms have a strong emotional pull and should be
accorded deference as long as those norms don’t get out of hand.’ And if
that’s all legal pluralism is adding, then the voluminous legal pluralism
scholarship does not appear to have altered the basic liberal legal
framework very much.
Interestingly, this critique of legal pluralism—that it is not a radical
re-shaping of the landscape but simply liberalism in another guise—is
178 Authority in transnational legal theory
Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Cotterell-Authority_in_transnational_legal_theory / Division: 06-BermanFINALISED /Pg. Position: 28
/ Date: 24/6
JOBNAME: Cotterell PAGE: 29 SESS: 3 OUTPUT: Thu Jul 28 10:18:42 2016
precisely the opposite of the criticism global legal pluralists usually
receive. Typically, the worry is that a pluralist framework will give too
much space for plural norms. Sovereigntists tend to object to the idea that
nation-states should ever take into account international, transnational or
non-state norms. Meanwhile, international law triumphalists chafe at the
idea that international norms should ever be subordinated to local
practices that may be less liberal or less rights-protecting. But both
positions are principally concerned that global legal pluralism will result
in too much fragmentation and too much deference to what are viewed as
illegitimate norms.
In contrast, some critics view legal pluralism (or at least the procedur-
alist version of legal pluralism I have advocated in this chapter and
elsewhere) as completely consonant with liberalism and therefore essen-
tially conventional and not truly pluralist enough to provide a fully
alternative vision.73 Accordingly, pluralists might actually be tempted to
welcome this critique because it offers a response to those who claim
pluralism is too extreme and destabilizing. After all, a position cannot
easily be simultaneously too radical and not radical enough. Thus,
pluralists might simply embrace the critique, allow for the fact that
pluralism is less radical than some imagine, and end the discussion there.
And yet I think there’s more to it than that. While pluralism need not
be conceptualized as inconsistent with liberalism, it is also not precisely
the same as liberalism. Instead, legal pluralism is significantly different
from the classic liberal vision in at least two important ways, one
descriptive and one normative.
First, as a descriptive matter, legal pluralists are far more likely than
traditional liberals even to notice the pluralism of legal and quasi-legal
norms that exist apart from the state. After all, most liberal theorists
begin their analysis with the state: how it is formed, how it is justified,
and the philosophical underpinnings for its operations. Non-state actors
are surely important to this inquiry in that they clash with the liberal
state, and of course the state, under liberalism, should often reach
positions of accommodation with these non-state actors. But what is
being described is fundamentally the state and how it views the non-state.
In contrast, pluralism assumes that the inquiry is the entire range of
legalities that course through the everyday experience of people. This
means that the lived reality of communities and day-to-day perceptions of
legitimacy and efficacy are far more important than philosophical mod-
els. Moreover, a pluralist perspective is more likely to see individuals and
73 Galán and Patterson 2013, above n 24.
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groups, rather than just the state, as having agency and therefore playing
crucial roles in navigating the interaction of normative systems and using
those systems strategically.
For example, in the classic colonial interaction, a quasi-liberal, state-
based legality was layered on top of an indigenous legal system. A liberal
theorist would focus on the newly imposed system and on how it either
accommodated or refused to accommodate local communities. In con-
trast, pluralists would observe that the colonial system did not wipe out
the indigenous system altogether, and would then focus on the interaction
of these legal systems and the way in which local actors used both
systems strategically to gain leverage.
This is only one of many possible examples. But the point is that
where liberalism only sees state legal systems and the challenges they
face, pluralists will see interactions among legal systems. And global
legal pluralism recognizes that nation-states must work within a frame-
work of multiple overlapping jurisdictional assertions by state, inter-
national, and non-state communities. Each of these types of overlapping
jurisdictional assertions creates a potentially hybrid legal space that is not
easily eliminated.
Just as important, pluralists are much less likely to insist on positivist
definitions of law and will therefore be willing to see law even in the
absence of coercive power. This is especially significant in the global
arena where statements of legal norms may be highly effective even in
the absence of such formal enforcement power.74 For example, liberal
sovereigntists sometimes insist that international, transnational and non-
state legal norms have no independent valence and that instead states
simply pursue their own interests. In contrast, pluralists unpack the idea
of a state interest, recognizing that conceptions of proper policy do not
simply arise in a vacuum. Rather, they are developed by human beings
operating with various sets of assumptions, ideas about justice, concep-
tions of global strategy, and beliefs about morality. These assumptions,
ideas, and cognitive categories are themselves shaped in part by what
socio-legal scholars have long termed legal consciousness. Accordingly,
the legal norms that are ‘in the air’ at any given moment of history—
including international, transnational and non-state legal norms—may
well affect how both policy-makers and ordinary citizens think about the
state’s interests.
74 Eg, J Brunnée and SJ Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International
Law: An Interactional Account (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010).
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Thus, legal pluralism provides a richer account of how law actually
operates, both domestically and internationally, than the positivist vision
of liberal sovereigntism. We imbibe legal norms and cognitive categories
even when we are not consciously aware of the norm in question. We are
persuaded by legal norms even when those norms are not literally enforce-
able. We act in accordance with law because doing so has become habitual,
not necessarily because we seek to avoid sanction. We conceive of our
interrelations with others in terms of law because our long-term interests
dictate that we do so, even when our short-term interest might seem to
counsel otherwise. And the existence of a legal norm alters the constitutive
terms of our relationships with others as well as the costs of noncompli-
ance. All of these factors may be overcome in some circumstances. Indeed,
people sometimes violate domestic law just as states sometimes violate
non-state law. But in neither case does that mean that the law in question
has no significant constraining force. And only by thinking more broadly
about changes in legal consciousness and the complicated social, political,
and psychological factors that enter into the conceptualization of state
interests can we begin to understand how non-state law operates.
In addition, instead of treating the state as a unitary ‘personality’ with
a single set of interests, pluralists recognize that the real world is far
messier, with a vast number of constituencies both within the govern-
mental bureaucracy and outside it. This cacophony of voices is important
because many of these voices, when advocating policy positions, can use
the moral authority or persuasive power of international, transnational
and non-state norms for leverage. These norms therefore become a tool
of empowerment for particular actors. And given that any state policy
decision is inevitably the result of a contest among various bureaucratic
power centres, all of which are themselves influenced by outside pressure
groups, lobbyists, NGOs and the like, a more complex understanding of
the global legal arena would need to explore ways in which plural legal
norms empower specific interests both within and without the state
policy-making apparatus.
In short, legal pluralism offers a more complicated descriptive account
of the interaction of normative systems, the strategic action of individuals
and groups in deploying these multiple systems to pursue their interests,
and the subtle processes by which even norms without coercive power
can change legal consciousness and gain efficacy over time. These
nuances are often elided in the traditional liberal legal analysis.75
75 W van der Burg, The Dynamics of Law and Morality: A Pluralist Account
of Legal Interactionism (Farnham, Ashgate, 2014).
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Second, as legal pluralism has developed a more normative bite, it has
been used to justify procedural mechanisms, institutional designs and
discursive practices aimed at developing habits of mind in decision-
makers that will encourage those decision-makers to use restraint in
insisting jurispathically on their own norms to the exclusion of the norms
of other communities. Thus, the key normative question from a pluralist
perspective is not simply: here are my norms, now how much should I
tolerate others? Instead, as discussed previously, this sort of proceduralist
pluralism will favour hybrid institutional designs and practices that will
embed principles of toleration and accommodation into day-to-day
operations. These designs and practices may well be consonant with
liberalism, but they result in a very different set of institutional arrange-
ments, inquiries, and jurisprudential tropes from the standard version of
liberal institutional tolerance.
For example, consider a governing council of decision-makers popu-
larly elected by citizens of a community. Assume that every council
member happens to be a member of the same majority ethnic, racial or
religious group within that broader community. If the election were
conducted fairly and the governing body does not unduly infringe
minority rights in its substantive decisions, then under most theories of
liberalism there is at least some justification for saying that this is a
legitimate arrangement. If one embraces the vision of legal pluralism I
pursue, however, one might reach the conclusion that even if this rule
solely by members of the dominant group is legitimate, it is likely not
preferable. This is because the procedural pluralist approach adds in a
preference for greater dialogue among multiple communities to improve
the quality of decision-making, to build habits of mind that inculcate
tolerance, and to make it more likely that the minority will acquiesce in
whatever substantive decisions are ultimately reached. Accordingly, fol-
lowing a more pluralist approach, one might decide to set aside certain
seats on the governing council for the minority group. Either of these
arrangements is likely compatible with liberalism; however, the pluralist
perspective adds an additional set of considerations to weigh in the
institutional design decision.
Thus, where liberal institutionalists might simply tolerate minority
viewpoints, a commitment to pluralist arrangements might lead to
institutional designs that require hybrid participation. Pluralist mech-
anisms can also create structural feedback loops, where institutional
decision-makers are forced to consider the approaches of other com-
munities. And while such mechanisms are not necessarily in opposition
to liberalism, they instantiate a set of concerns about structural inter-
actions that is distinct from liberalism. Finally, as discussed previously, a
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pluralist approach would also focus less on whether a state institution
tolerates a non-state community from a position of inherent superiority
and instead conceptualize the conflict between state and non-state
law-making as a true conflict-of-laws problem.
In the end I believe global legal pluralism offers a fundamentally
different analytical framework—both descriptively and normatively—
from liberalism. And while it may be that a pluralist perspective can fit
comfortably within a liberal philosophical stance (that depends on how
far the pluralist impulse is pushed in particular cases), I think a pluralist
perspective is likely to lead to both a more nuanced descriptive under-
standing of the world and a more desirable legal and political framework
for addressing the hybridity that surrounds us every day.
IX. GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM, THE RULE OF
LAW, AND DEMOCRACY
As global legal pluralism has successfully put forth a viable alternative
normative conception of the global legal order, we have seen, not
surprisingly, challenges to this pluralist framework. These challenges
most often focus on two dimensions: first, whether a pluralist framework
undermines the stability and predictability that are the hallmarks of the
rule of law; and second, whether acknowledging the potential efficacy of
transnational, international and non-state law fundamentally undermines
democratic principles by recognizing the importance of norms articulated
beyond the state polity.
With regard to rule of law, the concern is that any theory that leaves
supremacy claims undecided is simply a recipe for chaos. Yet, to some
degree this is simply a reality of a multivariate world of relative
authorities whether one embraces theories of pluralism or not. There is
no way to escape chaos because any claim to superior authority will
inevitably be contested and ultimately only be relative, not absolute.
Indeed, this is a particular problem if one tries to establish more
hierarchical, absolutist structures because such structures do not have
sufficient flexibility to adapt to change, challenge and contestation.
Pluralist structures, in contrast, often represent ‘a hybrid between hier-
archical and network forms of order’.76 As Krisch argues, such a hybrid
‘allows for regimes with an internally hierarchical structure, but denies
them ultimate supremacy, and thus navigates between routine hierarchies
76 Krisch 2010, above n 14, 239.
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and exceptional disruptions, to be solved eventually only through consen-
sual forms’. Thus, perhaps counter-intuitively, the flexibility inherent in
pluralist structures can be a source of stability because tensions in the
social order have space to play out in the legal governance structure
itself. Pluralism provides openings for multiple actors and multiple
voices and thus offers safety valves that more hierarchically-based
institutions typically lack. As such, we may find pluralist structures to be
more stable than hierarchical ones over time.77
As to democracy, some maintain that only territorially defined nation-
state communities can legitimately claim to exercise democratically
grounded power. But such a statement assumes much of what global
legal pluralism seeks to challenge, and it is far from clear that the
imperatives of democratic sovereignty necessarily render any consider-
ation of transnational, international or non-state jurisdictional assertions
illegitimate. First, it is no threat to sovereignty for a nation-state to decide
that its sovereign interests are advanced overall by deciding to defer to
norms or decisions of other institutions (whether state-based or not) that
limit what it can otherwise do. Second, some non-state norms (such as
international human rights norms) may actually strengthen domestic
democracy, properly understood. This is because constitutional democ-
racy already includes within it the idea that ‘all people (and not merely
the majority) can associate themselves with the project of self-
government’.78 Thus, obedience either to non-state norms that minimally
protect minority interests or to multilateral institutions that help guard
against capture of government by minority factions actually enhances
democracy rather than subverts it.79 Third, at least when non-state norms
influence or are formally incorporated into domestic law, such incorpor-
ation often occurs through the actions of domestic political actors on
either the national or local level,80 and it is unclear how there could be
democracy objections to such influence. Finally, and most fundamentally,
77 Halberstam 2012, above n 48.
78 CL Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (Cambridge MA, Harvard
University Press, 2002) 19.
79 R Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Consti-
tution (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1996); RO Keohane, S
Macedo and A Moravcsik, ‘Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism’ (2009) 63
International Organisations 1; J Mayerfeld, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of
International Human Rights Law’ (2009) 19 Indiana International and Compara-
tive Law Review 49.
80 J Resnik, ‘Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism
and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism’ (2007)
57 Emory Law Journal 31.
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legal norms have always migrated across territorial boundaries, and
precepts that come to be thought of as constitutive of a community can
often be traced historically to ideas borrowed from other sources outside
that community.81 ‘Ideas, norms, and practices do not stop at the lines
people draw across land,’82 and non-state norms are always translated
into local vernacular.83 This process of ‘vernacularization’ and the debate
about ideas, norms, and practices that go along with it are and always
have been part of democratic discourse, not in opposition to it. As Seyla
Benhabib has argued,
The spread of cosmopolitan norms … has yielded a … political condition [in
which] the local, the national and the global are all imbricated in one another.
Future democratic iterations will make their interconnections and inter-
dependence deeper and wider. Rather than seeing this situation as under-
mining democratic sovereignty, we can view it as promising the emergence of
new political configurations and new forms of agency … .84
In short, pluralist structures provide multiple ports of entry and multiple
opportunities for contestation. Such forms of contestation and counter-
democracy sit alongside typical electoral processes and may be seen to
be part of the character of a multi-dimensional democratic system. As
Krisch points out, ‘[e]lections will probably remain central to any
conceptualization of democracy, but some of the weight they carry
domestically might, in the postnational sphere, be borne by other,
contestatory mechanisms’.85
These are not complete answers, of course, either to the challenge
about certainty or the challenge about democracy. But they do indicate
that global legal pluralism does have a range of possible responses to
those challenges. Further research will be needed to empirically evaluate
the force of these challenges in a variety of factual settings and to further
build philosophical underpinnings for pluralism that respond to these
concerns.
81 Eg, J Resnik, ‘The Internationalism of American Federalism: Missouri and
Holland’ (2008) 73 Missouri Law Review 1105.
82 J Resnik, J Civin and J Frueh, ‘Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level:
Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors
(TOGAS)’ (2008) 50 Arizona Law Review 709.
83 SE Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International
Law into Local Justice (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2006).
84 S Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2008).
85 Krisch 2010, above n 14, 271.
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X. GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM AND ‘CLASSIC’
LEGAL PLURALISM
As noted at the outset, global legal pluralism builds upon earlier
scholarship focused on legal pluralism in more localized settings. Schol-
ars such as Sally Falk Moore, Leopold Pospisil, Franz and Keebet von
Benda Beckmann, Marc Galanter, John Griffiths and Sally Merry turned
to legal pluralism as a critique of liberal legality. And, true to this
political agenda, these scholars were sceptical about the hegemonic
impact caused by the framing discourse of law itself. They fought against
a de-historicized, hierarchical vision of law that allowed the takeover of
the legal field by state institutions. And they were thus acutely aware that
legal pluralism was a radical challenge to the presumed power of official
state systems.
Accordingly, one potential concern about global legal pluralism and
constitutional pluralism as they have evolved in their various incarnations
is that they have lost this edge of radical critique. Global legal pluralism
and constitutional pluralism, in an attempt to be more practically useful,
are perhaps less self-suspicious about the hegemony of liberal legal
discourse, procedures, and institutions, and they therefore tend to fall
back on such liberal legality in pursuing their normative programmes.
This argument is a useful one, and I think it is correct as far as it goes.
But that only means that the evolution of global legal pluralism is on a
different trajectory from the original legal pluralists. Indeed, the context
and aims of global legal pluralism and constitutional pluralism are very
different from those of classic legal pluralism. Importantly, the classic
legal pluralists were principally engaged in critique of a dominant view
of legality, and they were pursuing this critique primarily from the
perspective of thicker description. It is no accident that many of the
original legal pluralists were social scientists, not law professors or legal
philosophers. And while these authors did likely have a normative
sympathy for counter-hegemonic legalities, such normative commitments
were generally unstated and implicit.
In contrast, constitutional pluralists and many global legal pluralists are
actually trying to advocate a plausible set of institutional arrangements
and procedural mechanisms in order to make dominant legal and
governmental entities more pluralist in orientation. That is a very
different starting point, and it is therefore not surprising that these
scholars do indeed tend to embrace aspects of liberal legality as a given.
Thus, it is undoubtedly true that the new generation of global legal
pluralists has not severed ties with classic state-based legal theory (and
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its limits), but it is also true that this new generation is no longer aiming
to completely sever such ties in the name of radical critique; it is instead
trying to introduce more pluralist frameworks into hegemonic structures
to make them more accommodating to hybridity. And that means there
will be limitations on the range of hybridity, the language used, and the
sorts of arguments entertained. But, these scholars would argue, the result
is still better than if no pluralism had been introduced into the framework
at all.
Some may not agree. They may say that it’s not a truly pluralist vision
unless it goes all the way and rejects (or at least challenges) the discourse
of law itself. It is fine to make that argument. But I think such critics
should at least also acknowledge that such a position makes it difficult to
put forward a practical programme with a chance of being implemented
in a still largely state-based world. Accordingly, the less radical nature of
constitutional pluralism or global legal pluralism is not an un-
self-conscious adoption of hegemonic frameworks, but a conscious
choice to participate in a discourse about institutional design that would
not be available without at least adopting certain assumptions and
conventions.
Does this evolution mean that global legal pluralism is not truly
pluralism at all? Certainly the new variants of legal pluralism are less
oppositional and are willing to countenance liberal legal hegemony even
while seeking to open more space for alternative voices within the
framework. And it is likewise fair and appropriate to criticize these
approaches for precisely that choice. But I think it is unduly doctrinaire
and closed-minded to say that such approaches cannot rightly call
themselves pluralist or draw on an earlier tradition, even if that tradition
was somewhat different in its focus. The nature of scholarly threads is
that an idea put forth in one context and with one aim can be
appropriated and developed in another context for slightly different
purposes. And of all people pluralists should understand that.
We can perhaps criticize global legal pluralism or constitutional
pluralism for not being sufficiently counter-hegemonic, but as we do so,
we need to first acknowledge that both the goals and the institutional role
of the new pluralists are fundamentally different from the old, and so we
should not be surprised that the resulting scholarship is also different,
both in tone and in content. Second, we need to recognize that at least
some of these pluralists are keenly aware that, as noted previously, the
pluralist vision is often consistent with liberalism even though it is a
structurally different framework; there is no lack of self-consciousness or
self-suspicion in that. And, third, we must understand that whether or not
a scholar is an ‘heir’ to an earlier strand of scholarship is not for a purist
The evolution of global legal pluralism 187
Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Cotterell-Authority_in_transnational_legal_theory / Division: 06-BermanFINALISED /Pg. Position: 37
/ Date: 27/7
JOBNAME: Cotterell PAGE: 38 SESS: 3 OUTPUT: Thu Jul 28 10:18:42 2016
gatekeeper to regulate; ideas morph in plural ways, and the recent moves
to constitutional and global legal pluralism are just a few of the many
plural variants of pluralism, which is as it should be.
CONCLUSION
The evolution of global legal pluralism scholarship is astonishing in its
variety, richness, empirical detail, and theoretical sophistication. Indeed,
this survey merely scratches the surface of the burgeoning literature in
the field. And, over the coming decades, we can expect this scholarly
framework to develop further, putting forth new models for conceptual-
izing interactions among relative, non-hierarchically organized legal
orders, identifying new mechanisms, institutions and practices for struc-
turing such interactions, and evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of
the regimes that emerge. This literature, taken as a whole, will continue
to offer a distinct and powerful ongoing challenge to the more formalist
models of classic international relations and international legal theory.
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